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As more corporations turn to the securities markets to meet their funding needs, the role
of banks as providers of credit to large businesses seems increasingly uncertain. But a look
at developments during the financial market turmoil last fall suggests that banks are still a
critical source of liquidity at times of economic stress.
Over the past twenty-five years, an increasing number
of financial transactions have moved from banks to the
securities markets. During the same period, competing
financial institutions have expanded the range of
traditional banking services they offer customers. Both
thrifts and finance companies now provide loans to
small businesses, and money market mutual funds offer
close substitutes for checkable deposits. This shift
toward the financial markets and nontraditional financial
institutions has significantly reduced the role of banks
in providing credit to U.S. businesses. The decreasing
reliance on bank credit has been most pronounced
among large corporations, which now tend to turn to the
securities markets to fulfill their short- and long-term
financing needs.
These changes have led many people to question
whether banks remain important in the financing of
large corporations. In this edition of Current Issues, we
argue that they do. Despite their declining role in the
provision of credit, banks continue to perform a critical
function in providing liquidity to large corporations,
particularly during periods of economic stress.
To support our point, we analyze the effects of last
fall’s economic turmoil in the securities markets on the
borrowing practices of large corporations. Our analysis
shows that during this period, borrowing in the com-
mercial paper market—the primary source of short-
term funding for large corporations—grew too expen-
sive, causing many borrowers to turn to bank loans until
interest rates stabilized. By providing a backup source
of liquidity, banks helped insulate many large corpora-
tions from market shocks.
We then show why banks are better equipped than
other financial intermediaries to provide this liquidity
insurance. An analysis of how banks fund themselves
suggests that they have an advantage over competing
financial institutions because they tend to experience
deposit inflows when liquidity elsewhere dries up.
The Changing Role of Banks in Offering Credit
Over the past three decades, securities markets have
captured a growing share of financial transactions. For
example, the share of credit to nonfinancial businesses
from bonds and commercial paper rose from about 45 per-
cent in the mid-1970s to about 55 percent by the mid-
1990s.1 All types of debt instruments have also become
more marketable. Corporate bonds issued in public
markets have increased significantly as a portion of
total corporate bonds, rising about 25 percent since the
late 1960s.2 In addition, illiquid loans that in the past
would have remained on bank balance sheets are now
used to create tradable securities. This process, known
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1970s, and then to both consumer loans and business
loans in the 1980s and 1990s. As a result of securitization,
loans originated by banks are often ultimately held by
mutual funds and pension funds. A growing portion of
financial assets can now be held by nonbank inter-
mediaries; in fact, banks’ share of total assets held by
financial intermediaries fell about 50 percent from
1980 to the middle of the 1990s.
As banks’ role in providing credit has declined, cor-
porations have increasingly turned to securities markets
to obtain credit. For most large, highly rated corpora-
tions, the commercial paper market is now the primary
source of short-term credit. Banks’ role, as we will see,
is to provide the commercial paper issuers with insur-
ance against market shocks.
The Commercial Paper Market
Commercial paper is an unsecured form of short-term
debt used by large, well-established corporations for
their short-term borrowing needs. Commercial paper is
attractive because it usually carries an interest rate
lower than that on a comparable loan. During the first
half of 1998, for example, a typical issuer could borrow
money in the commercial paper market at interest rates
about 50 basis points below bank loan rates.3 Thus,
under normal conditions, firms prefer to use commer-
cial paper rather than to borrow from banks.
Under certain circumstances, however, turmoil in the
financial markets can cause the interest rates on commer-
cial paper to rise. Issuers are vulnerable to such rate
increases when their commercial paper matures and they
wish to refinance. To protect themselves, firms routinely
secure a commercial paper backup line of credit with a
bank. This line of credit provides a firm with the right to
borrow any amount of money up to a specified level at
any time. When commercial paper grows too costly, the
firm can borrow from its line of credit, paying the bank
interest at a predetermined rate equal to a fixed markup
over a low-risk benchmark interest rate such as LIBOR.
Because the firm’s borrowing rate cannot exceed the rate
guaranteed by the backup line of credit, the backup line of
credit acts as an insurance policy against liquidity shocks
that can drive up credit spreads over low-risk rates.4
Liquidity Crises and Bank Lending
The role of banks in supplying liquidity insurance for
commercial paper can be traced to a financial crisis in
1970, when Penn Central Transportation Company filed
for bankruptcy with more than $80 million in commer-
cial paper outstanding. As a result, other large compa-
nies had difficulty refinancing their commercial paper
as it matured, even though the problems of Penn Central
had little to do with their prospects. In response to the
default, commercial paper issuers began establishing
backup lines of credit with banks to prevent future dis-
ruptions in financing stemming from market turmoil.
In the thirty years since these events, however,
corporations have been able to take advantage of many
alternative sources of credit. To investigate whether cor-
porations still turn to bank financing at times of economic
stress, we look at developments in the commercial
paper market and bank lending during the financial
market turbulence last fall.
Beginning in August 1998, when the Russian govern-
ment announced its intention to default on its bonds,
volatility in foreign financial markets increased, equity
prices fell, and credit spreads for bonds of all maturities
and ratings widened. These troubles abroad spilled over
into U.S. markets. The yield spread between risky corpo-
rate bonds and safe Treasury bonds of similar maturity
rose by nearly 100 basis points in September, a 60 percent
increase over August rates (Chart 1).5 Commercial paper
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Chart 1
The Path of Three Yield Spreads
Percentage points
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: The low-grade bond spread is the difference between interest rates on 
BAA-rated bonds and ten-year Treasury bonds. The high-grade commercial
paper spread is the difference between interest rates on paper issued by AA-rated
nonfinancial companies and on three-month Treasury bills. The low-grade
commercial paper spread is the difference between interest rates on paper issued
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For most large, highly rated corporations,
the commercial paper market is now
the primary source of short-term credit.rates rose even more over the same period—the yield
spread between commercial paper rates and short-term
Treasury bill rates (the “paper-bill” spread) more than
doubled. The paper-bill spread for highly rated (AA) non-
financial companies widened from 45 basis points at the
beginning of July to more than 140 basis points in October.
The paper-bill spread for lower rated (A2/P2) companies
followed a similar path, increasing from 65 basis points in
early July to more than 180 basis points in October.
The widening of spreads was part of a “flight to quality”
in which investors’ willingness to hold risky securities
fell suddenly and dramatically. In the commercial paper
market, wide spreads gave issuers a strong incentive to
draw on their preexisting lines of bank credit. Given
this incentive, we would expect to see a decline in the
volume of commercial paper outstanding and a rise in bank
lending following Russia’s default announcement.
Before August, total commercial paper outstanding
issued by nonfinancial companies had exhibited steady
growth, rising from $191 billion in January 1997 to about
$225 billion by July 1998. As the paper-bill spreads
widened at the end of the third quarter of 1998, however,
the volume of nonfinancial paper outstanding began to fall,
dropping from more than $245 billion in the middle of
September to $229 billion by year-end (Chart 2).6
We can conclude from the drop in commercial paper
outstanding that borrowers found liquidity in the market
expensive. But did corporations respond by drawing
funds from their bank lines of credit? To answer this
question, we first look at the weekly reporting of com-
mercial and industrial (C&I) loans by large U.S. banks.
These data show that as the volume of commercial
paper outstanding declined, large commercial banks’
C&I lending growth accelerated (Chart 3).7 Before
September, both commercial paper and C&I loans had
been growing at about 1 percent per month. From
September to the beginning of November, when the
value of commercial paper outstanding declined by
almost $10 billion, C&I lending by large commercial
banks rose by more than $20 billion. The rate of growth
in large banks’ C&I lending was double the rate
observed earlier in the year.
Because the weekly reporting data do not distinguish
new lending from lending drawn from existing lines of
credit, the possibility exists that the acceleration in loan
growth was the result of new loan originations.
Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests otherwise. The
New York Times, for example, reported in November
1998 that “rather than signaling a flow of new loans,
much of the lending [growth] appears to be borrowers’
drawing on existing lines of credit.”8 In addition, infor-
mation from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan
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Chart 2
Commercial Paper Spread and Nonfinancial
Commercial Paper Outstanding
Percentage points
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Note: The commercial paper spread is the difference between interest rates






















Nonfinancial Commercial Paper Outstanding
and Commercial and Industrial Loans





















In the commercial paper market [in the
fall of 1998], wide spreads gave issuers
a strong incentive to draw on their
preexisting lines of bank credit.database suggests that a relatively small number of new
loans went to large corporations during this period.9
According to these data, the flow of new loans to large
corporations began to trail off in July 1998 and stayed
low for the remainder of the year (see table). Excluding
January, when new lending is typically low, originations
averaged $154 billion per month during the first half of
the year and $124 billion during the second half of the
year. The decline in new loans over 1998 contrasts
sharply with the pattern of lending in 1997; in that year,
loan originations were 14 percent higher in the second
half than they were in the first half. As the figures show,
1998 loan originations were 16 percent lower from July
to December than they were from January to June.
We conduct one further test to make sure that companies
were drawing on existing lines of credit. We compare
growth in C&I lending at large banks holding relatively
high levels of unused loan commitments with growth at
large banks holding relatively low levels of unused com-
mitments.10 If loan growth accelerated because borrowers
were drawing funds from existing loan commitments,
then the first set of banks should have experienced
more rapid expansion of their on-balance-sheet lending
than the second set.11 We again use the data from the
weekly reporting banks to focus on the September-
October 1998 period, when commercial paper rates
were particularly high and commercial paper volume
began a sustained decline. C&I loans grew fastest in the
first set of banks—by about 6 percent. In contrast, lend-
ing at large banks with relatively little lending under
commitment grew only about 2 percent. The value of
total loans outstanding grew $15 billion for the banks
with high levels of loan commitments but rose only $4
billion for the other banks.12
Why Are Banks Well Positioned to Provide
Liquidity Insurance?
So far we have explained why companies turn to banks in
times of economic turmoil, but why do banks, rather than
other financial institutions, fill unexpected liquidity
needs? Issuers of lines of credit must have the capacity to
provide liquidity when it is needed. By holding large
amounts of cash and safe securities as assets, many types
of financial institutions could ensure that they had the
means to provide customers with liquidity on demand.
This “buffer stock” approach, however, is costly because
these assets do not provide a high return.13 Alternatively,
financial institutions could achieve the capacity to meet
liquidity needs while avoiding some of the associated
costs by funding themselves in a way that would reduce
their reliance on cash and safe securities.
In a recent article, Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (1999)
explore one aspect of bank funding that puts these insti-
tutions in a position to provide liquidity more cheaply
than other financial intermediaries. The authors suggest
that banks owe their edge over other institutions to the fact
that they combine committed lending with deposit-taking
services. According to Kashyap et al., two observations
suggest that these services can be provided most effi-
ciently within a single organization: first, most committed
lending is conducted by banks; second, banks with a
greater number of demand deposits provide more liquidity
insurance through lines of credit and loan commitments
than do other banks.
But how, precisely, do banks achieve such cost effi-
ciency? As Kashyap et al. explain, demand deposits act
very much like loan commitments: After placing funds
in the bank, depositors can withdraw those funds from
their accounts at any time. As a consequence, banks
need a buffer stock of liquid assets to support their pro-
vision of demand deposits, just as they need a buffer
stock to support their loan commitments. Since banks
offer lending and deposit-taking services together, how-
ever, they are able to economize on the quantity of cash
and safe securities they hold, maintaining a smaller
buffer than would be required by two financial interme-
diaries offering these services separately. These savings
in turn allow banks to provide liquidity to their customers
at lower cost.
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New Loan Originations during 1998
Volume of New Loans













Source: Loan Pricing Corporation, Dealscan database.
[During the financial market turmoil
in the fall,] the rate of growth
in large banks’C&I lending was double
the rate observed earlier in the year.The argument advanced by Kashyap and his co-
authors clearly depends on the assumption that the need
for liquidity by depositors is not strongly correlated
with the need for liquidity by borrowers—in other
words, that depositors are unlikely to withdraw funds
from their accounts at the same time that firms are tap-
ping bank credit lines. We present additional support
for the authors’argument—and shed further light on the
way in which banks’ method of funding gives them an
advantage in providing liquidity insurance—by showing
that the liquidity needs of depositors and borrowers may
actually be negatively correlated.
A negative correlation will arise if many small
investors, acting on the belief that banks provide a safe
haven for their funds, move their wealth into deposits
during periods of market turmoil. If, in fact, deposit
inflows tend to occur when borrowers’ liquidity
demands are greatest, then banks are indeed well
equipped to meet these demands without drawing heavily
on their buffer stock of liquid assets.
We draw our evidence of a negative correlation from
a look at how banks funded their rapid loan growth dur-
ing the fall of 1998. Deposits at large banks grew very
rapidly during the months when firms were drawing
down their backup lines of credit—even faster than the
growth in business lending (Chart 4). C&I lending rose
by about $20 billion between September and October.
During this period, deposits increased by about $25 bil-
lion and continued to grow rapidly for another several
weeks. Because of the inflow of deposits, banks did not
have to run down their buffer stock of liquid assets to
provide liquidity to borrowers. Together, cash plus secu-
rities held by banks actually increased from September
to October (Chart 4).14 Part of the rise in deposits can be
attributed to an inflow of funds from foreign banks and
from U.S. banks’ own offices abroad.15 This inflow of
funds most likely stemmed from the perception that a
financial crisis originating outside the United States would
affect U.S. banks less than other countries’banks.
Conclusion
Securities markets have become increasingly important
in providing funding to businesses. Banks’ role in sup-
plying credit has been steadily declining, as their falling
share of total nonfinancial debt clearly shows. The
decreasing reliance on bank loans has been most pro-
nounced among large businesses, which routinely use
the commercial paper market to fill short-term funding
needs and the bond market for long-term needs.
In our judgment, however, the decline in the relative
importance of banks in financing large firms has been
overstated—in a pinch, even the largest and most highly
rated companies go to banks for liquidity. Last year,
when spreads increased and volume decreased in the
commercial paper markets as a result of turmoil in the
securities markets, large firms chose to draw down
funds from backup lines of credit. With market liquidity
regarded as too expensive, banks proved to be a reliable
source of liquidity for nonfinancial firms.
Notes
1. For a more detailed description of changes in debt markets and
the role of new information technologies, see Mishkin and
Strahan (1999). For a description of banks’ role in lending to
small businesses, see Strahan and Weston (1998).
2. This estimate is based on the authors’ calculations from Carey
et al. (1993, Table D.1).
3. During this period, the thirty-day high-grade nonfinancial
commercial paper rate averaged 5.50 percent; the thirty-day U.S.
dollar LIBOR rate averaged 5.65 percent. As of June 30, 1998,
the average spread on all lines of credit to firms with a commercial
paper rating from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan data-
base was 35 basis points above LIBOR.
4. Interest rates on bank lines of credit typically float over a short-
term market rate, so borrowers receive insurance against changes in
credit spreads but not against changes in the level of interest rates.
FRBNY 5
Chart 4
Large Bank Holdings: Cash Plus U.S. Government
Securities Relative to Deposits
Four-Week Moving Average



















Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Because of the inflow of deposits, banks
did not have to run down their buffer
stock of liquid assets to provide
liquidity to borrowers.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
Borrowers that have established loan commitments, however, seem
to suffer less from monetary policy tightenings than do other bor-
rowers (Hirtle 1990; Morgan 1998).
5. The data used to construct Charts 1-4 are available online at
www.federalreserve.gov.
6. Our data on commercial paper volume are not broken out by the
rating of the issuer. Nevertheless, given the changes in prices, we
would expect that volume fell more for the low-rated commercial
paper issuers than for the highly rated ones.
7. Data on bank lending are based on weekly reporting by a sample of
banks. These figures, scaled up to reflect the balance sheets of all small
banks and all large banks, are reported in the H.8 statistical release
issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
8. Louis Uchitelle, “Sure, Banks Are Lending, But Will They Keep
It Up?” New York Times, November 1, 1998.
9. Dealscan is a database of loan originations to large publicly
traded companies. Although this database does not contain detailed
information on all types of new lending, it provides very complete
coverage of lending to large businesses in the United States. The
data come primarily from Securities and Exchange Commission fil-
ings, although the Loan Pricing Corporation also receives data from
large loan syndicators and its own staff of reporters.
10. Banks offer many types of loan commitments to businesses. In
general, a loan commitment obligates the bank to provide funds on
demand up to a specified amount at a predetermined price.
Commercial paper backup lines of credit are a specific form of loan
commitment offered mainly by large banks.
11. To make this comparison, we split the top fifty banks into two
groups of twenty-five based on a scaled measure of unused loan
commitments at the end of third-quarter 1998. This measure is
defined as the ratio of total unused commitments for credit extended
through overdraft facilities or commercial lines of credit to the sum
of these unused commitments and total C&I loans. These data come
from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council’s
Reports of Condition and Income.
12. Note that these two sets of banks reported about the same
amount of total C&I lending at the beginning of the period.
13. A large buffer stock of cash and securities also creates agency
costs because managers may be tempted to waste or misinvest the
funds. See Jensen (1986) and Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (1999).
14. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, H.8 statisti-
cal release.
15. Small banks also experienced deposit inflows at this time.
Although small banks normally supply funds to large banks, large
banks did not experience an increase in funding from small banks
during the fall of 1998.
References
Carey, Mark, Steven Prowse, John Rea, and Gregory Udell. 1993.
“The Economics of the Private Placement Market.” Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System Staff Study no. 166.
Hirtle, Beverly. 1990. “Bank Loan Commitments and the
Transmission of Monetary Policy.” Unpublished paper, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, June.
Jensen, Michael C. 1986. “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers.” American Economic Review
76, no. 2 (May): 323-9. Papers and Proceedings of the 98th
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association,
December 1985.
Kashyap, Anil K, Raghuram Rajan, and Jeremy Stein. 1999. “Banks
as Liquidity Providers.” Unpublished paper, January.
Mishkin, Frederic S., and Philip E. Strahan. 1999. “What Will
Technology Do to the Financial Structure?” In Robert Litan and
Anthony Santomero, eds., The Effect of Technology on the
Financial Sector. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial
Services.
Morgan, Donald. 1998. “The Credit Effects of Monetary Policy.”
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 30, no. 1: 102-18.
Strahan, Philip E., and James P. Weston. 1998. “Small Business
Lending and the Changing Structure of the Banking Industry.”
Journal of Banking and Finance 22, nos. 2-6: 821-45.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
About the Authors
Marc R. Saidenberg is an economist and Philip E. Strahan an assistant vice president in the Banking
Studies Function of the Research and Market Analysis Group.
Current Issues in Economics and Finance is published by the Research and Market Analysis Group of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. Dorothy Meadow Sobol is the editor.
Subscriptions to Current Issues are free. Write to the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, 33 Liberty Street, New York, N.Y. 10045-0001, or call 212-720-6134. Current Issues is also available at the
Research and Market Analysis Group’s web site: http://www.ny.frb.org/rmaghome/curr_iss/1999.html.